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I.  Macro-level Hypotheses with Macro & Micro-level Data Generating Processes 
 
The limitations of testing macro-level hypotheses with 
macro-level data. 
 
The broader question of understanding dynamics across 
levels of analysis—macro to micro and micro to macro. 
 
II. Choosing Temporal Units of Analysis: The Issue of Granularity 
 
How fine-grained a unit should one select for a time-
varying Y—minute, hour, day, week, year, decade? 
 
III. Missed opportunities for Temporal Disaggregation 
 
Longitudinal analysis of a single cross-sectional sample 
survey; Difference in Difference estimation with or 
without temporal aggregation
 
I.  Macro-level Hypotheses—Some Examples 
 
 
 
1. Xj: Electronic vs. Paper & Pencil Records Yj: Clinic Efficiency (# Patients seen/day)  
J: Clinic 
 
2. Xj: Open Seat vs. Incumbent Running  Yj: Closeness of Election 
J: U.S. Congressional District 
 
3. Xj: Ease of Registration to Vote   Yj: State-level Turnout 
J: U.S. State 
 
4. Xj: Social Capital (% Trusting & Joining) Yj: Rate of Crime, Mortality, Tolerance…. 
J: U.S. State 
 
5. Xj: % Catholic in State    Yj: State-level Abortion Laws 
J: State 
 
6. Xj: Seniority      Yj: Legislative Success (% bills that pass) 
J: Member of Legislature 
 
 
In such cases, a stylized [and, to be sure, simplified and reductionist] representation of 
the data generating process looks like this: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Some analysts work entirely with macro-level data, estimating this relationship directly: 
 
 
Xj                    Yj 
 
 
Other analysts focus on the left-hand side but ignore the right-hand side.
Macro-level Xj    Yj
        Logical PathCausal Path   
  
Micro-level   Yij
So What? 
 
A. Because an analyst in the first group is interested in XjYj, and (let's say), has no 
interest at all in XjYij, he or she is not guilty of the ecological fallacy in 
analyzing J-level data. 
 
C.   Analysts in the second group miss an opportunity to develop the macro-level 
implications of micro-level dynamics (themselves tied to macro-level 
developments). 
 
B. Yet, for reasons that I will lay out below, the better practice is to: 
 
Macro-level Xj    Y j
   Causal Path
  
Micro-level  
     Logical Path
 Yij
  
  
1.  Estimate the effect of Xj on Yij in a multi-level framework. 
 
2.  Then use logical induction to determine the effect of Xj on Y 
  
 
X: Electronic vs. Paper & Pencil Records      
Yij: Doctor Efficiency (# Patients seen by doctor/day)  I: Doctor 
Yj: Clinic Efficiency (# Patients seen/day)    J: Clinic 
Xj: Open Seat vs. Incumbent Running 
Yij: Individual Vote Choice, Individual Turnout   I: Citizen 
Yj: Closeness of Election       J: Congressional district 
Xj: Ease of Registration to Vote 
Yij: Individual Turnout        I: Citizen 
Yj: State-level Turnout        J: State 
Xj: Social Capital Index 
Yij: Individual Pugnacity       I: Citizen 
Yj: State Pugnacity         J: State 
Xj: % Catholic in State     
Yij: Votes on Abortion Laws       I: Legislator 
Yj: State-level Abortion Laws      J: State 
Xj: Seniority 
Yij: Did bill sponsored pass?       I: Bill   
Yj: Legislative Success (% bills that pass)    J: Legislator
To start, suppose a very simple random intercepts multilevel model:  
 
Level 1 (doctor):   ijijjij exy  110      (1) 
Level 2 (clinic):   jjj uw 0101000       (2) 
Reduced Form:    jijijjij uexwy 01110100     (3) 
 
ijy — the typical number of patients the th doctor in thei j th clinic sees in a day.  
ijx1 — “doctor quality” (say), ranging from low (0) to high (1) quality. 
jw1 — clinic system of record-keeping system, paper & pencil (0) or electronic (1). 
ije — doctor-level error term 
ju0 — clinic-level error term 
 
Suppose you regress jy on jx1 and  instead of regressing on and j . jw1 ijy ijx1 w1
 
PROBLEM #1: INEFFICIENCY 
 
So long as some of the variation in is between-group variation, the 
correlation between 
ijx1
jx1 and will be higher in absolute value than the 
correlation between and . Estimation will be less precise.  
jw1
jw1ijx1
Shown are average coefficients and standard errors across 1,000 simulations.  Results labeled "OLS" and 
"Multilevel" use the disaggregated data.  The "aggregate" analysis gives results from an OLS regression of ijy on 
and jw1 jx1
True: jijijjij uexwy 011 25.25.  ,  and  iid normal (0, .0625), =10,000,ije ju0 n J =100, 50  jn 150 
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
OLS Multilevel Aggregate OLS Multilevel Aggregate OLS Multilevel Aggregate
Simulation Results
W and X correlated at .50
Doctor Quality (X)                                            Clinic Records (W)                                        Clinic Records (W)
Fully Specified Model                                       Fully Specified Model                                     Misspecified Model  
PROBLEM #2: BIASED ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF  jw1
 
A.  Ignoring the individual-level process and neglecting to include (aggregated) 
individual-level variables. 
 
B.  Bias tied to Problems involving Non-linear or Non-additive  effects ijx
 
If the effects of the individual-level Xs are non-linear or non-additive, analysis at the 
aggregate data will typically produce biased estimates of those effects.   
 
Non-linear (e.g., quadratic): 
How  varies with *  across individuals will in most circumstances not 
correspond to how 
ijy ijx1 ijx1
jy  varies with jj xx 11 *  across groups.   
 
Non-additive (e.g., product interaction): 
xHow varies with *  across individuals will not ordinarily equal how  ijy ijx1 ij2
jy  varies with jx1 * j2x  across groups.  
 
This is well known from the literature on ecological inference and the ecological fallacy.  
The reason we care about this is because bias in those estimates will, in turn, bias 
estimates of the effect of the macro-level independent variable ( ).jw1
C.  Bias in aggregate-level estimation of what are actually cross-level interactions. 
 
The analyst is (or could be) interested in how the effect of the macro-level 
variable depends on individual-level characteristics.  Of interest, here, is the 
effect of *  on  but the aggregate-level analyst is considering how ijx1 jw1 ijy
jj wx 11 * affects jy .  In many circumstances, the two will not agree. 
 
D.  The model excludes important variables that are correlated with . ijx jw1
 
Bias due to (and ) correlated with will bedevil a multi-level analysis as 
well, but becomes more severe when the analysis is aggregated:    
ije ju jw1
 
"The cause is the averaging process that aggregation imposes on data.  After 
averaging, much individual variation is smoothed out, and central limit 
theorems have their usual effects.  . . . .  The result is that biases too small to be 
of great concern in individual-level data become powerful sources of bias in the 
aggregate data.  An imperfect but serviceable specification at the microlevel 
becomes useless at the macrolevel."  (Achen and Shively 1995, p. 110) 
 
 
 
 
E.  The macro-level variable of interest is an aggregate variable — jx1 — and is 
affected by both 
ijy
jx1  and  ijx1
 
 Examples:  
 
As own income , conservatism  
As average income in state , conservatism  
 
As own time-to-diagnosis in a hospital , the probability of having unnecessary 
surgery  
As average time-to-diagnosis in hospital , the probability of having unnecessary 
surgery  
 
 
The aggregate-level analysis is essentially giving you the average of the two effects.  
Unless the two effects are the same, the aggregate analysis will get both of them wrong. 
 
F.  The macro-level variable of interest is a relational variable —one that targets some micro-
level units and not (or more than) other micro-level units. 
 
Examples: 
 
 Campaign to mobilize Democrats (but not Republicans) within a place 
 Tax policy that benefits those earning > $100k but not those earning < $100k 
 
Two ways to think about relational macro-level variables: 
 
(1) Relational macro-level variables are effectively individual-level variables, e.g.: 
  
Score 0 if individual lives in place without tax policy 
Score 1 if individual lives in place with tax policy and is not targeted (make < $100k) 
Score 2 if individual lives in place with tax policy and is targeted (make > $100k) 
 
(2) Hypotheses about relational macro-level variables require cross-level interactions—i.e., in this 
example, the hypothesis implies a model that includes: 
 
jw1  whether live in place with the tax policy in question 
ijx1  whether or not make more than $100k 
jw1 *  ijx1
 
Either way, addressing the macro-level hypothesis requires individual-level data. 
Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman (2003) 
 
Key question: What explains legislative success?   
The ideas: 
 
i  Legislative initiative ("bill") one has sponsored 
j  Member of U.S. Congress (MC) 
ijy  Probability that a bill that an MC sponsors passes 
jy  Legislative Success—proportion of bills that an MC sponsors that pass 
ijx1  Speaking vs. not speaking on behalf of a bill one sponsored (sending a cue as to a bill's importance) 
jx1     Being voluble, generally ("delivering too many speeches might result in a member being perceived as 
difficult or obstructionist") 
ijx2  Hot Bills (“that maybe be able to ride a wave of political interest into legislative success")  
ijx3   Local Bills  
jw1  Seniority of MC 
jw2  MC's prior margin of electoral victory 
jw3    Party of MC 
 
The analysis is carried out at the MC level.  Among other things: 
 
jx1  represents the effects of jx1 and  ijx1
 
ijx2 (% of bills introduced that are hot) and ijx3  (% of bills introduced that are local) are used, respectively, 
to estimate the effects of and  ijx2 ijx3
A concocted (half-baked) example: 
 
Key Question:  Do state voter registration laws affect state turnout? 
 
Why state turnout? 
 
(1) Normative—concerns about systematic political inequality 
(2) Policy-related—where would a policy change make the most difference? 
(3) Theoretical—State-level turnout important to theory of, say, party competition 
 
What I did: 
 
Modeled individual-level turnout as a function of age (recoded to range from 0-1), age-squared, 
educational attainment (5-point scale), and "state-level registration laws"—1=easy, 0=hard. 
 
To keep it simple, used linear probability model and OLS. 
 
Better:  Get better (real) measure of state registration law variation; use sigmoid probability model 
and Logit/Probit; match on covariates 
 
Ran individual-level model and also aggregate, state-level model  
 
Goals here:  
 
To demonstrate how findings regarding the macro-level hypothesis differ across approaches 
To illustrate an induction of macro-level implications from micro-level results. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
State-Level Analysis (n=35)
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State-level    
b=.037, p=.231 (n=35) 
 
Individual-level  
b=.074, p=.003 (n=1503) 
Moving to the Macro Level: 
 
(1)  In states with hard registration, find percentage of state residents who would be turned from non-
voters to voters if the policy were to change (to easy). 
 
If probability of voting is < .426, no change—still would not vote 
If probability of voting is > .500, no change—already votes 
If probability of voting is between .426 and .500, would turn from non-voter to voter 
 
% of individuals turning from non-voter to voter:  4.38% 
Average state-level increase in turnout:  4.40%  
 
(2) In states with easy registration, find percentage of state residents who would be turned from voters to 
non-voters if the policy were to change (to hard). 
 
If probability of voting is >.574, no change—still would vote 
If probability of voting is <.500, no change—already does not vote 
If probability of voting is between .574 and .500, would turn from voter to non-voter 
 
% of individuals turning from voter to non-voter:  2.91% 
Average state-level decrease in turnout:  2.54%  
                                                 

 Analogue of average treatment effect on the untreated 
 Analogue of average treatment effect on the treated 
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Moving from Micro-level findings to Macro-level Implications 
 
 
1. Very simple in some instances—e.g., doctor patients/day to clinic patients/day 
 
2. Manageably simple in other instances—e.g., from the probability that an individual will vote to the 
proportion in a given place that vote. 
 
3. But not simple/manageably simple if we abandon the atomistic view of "individual units"—e.g., 
bring in diffusion, contagion, thresholds, and so on. 
 
4. And not simple/manageably simple if we add complexity to the theoretical statement of how 
macro-level Xs affect macro-level Ys.  Even simple elaborations can make the logical induction 
from micro to macro quite difficult.  For example, if a targeted political campaign (macro X) affects 
both the turnout (Y1) and the vote choice (Y2) of the citizens it reaches. 
 
5. And, of course, the MicroMacro link may not (in many cases) be logical, but instead be causal. 
This is at least as worthy of investigation as the kind of case considered here. 
 
6. For at least some problems, the better strategy may be to build a complex (e.g., agent-based) model 
and develop testable implications that can be evaluated with simpler research designs and data 
collections. 
 
 
To Sum Up:  
 
Macro-level hypotheses that involve macro & micro-level data generating processes should be evaluated 
through analyses that work with data on both (or all) levels even if the proposition of interest is only 
directly concerned with the macro level. 
 
Working with (observational) macro-level data, alone, produces inefficiencies, bias in estimation, and is 
just-plain incapable of representing the dynamics involved. 
 
1.  Inefficient, even when no bias introduced (e.g., macro-X is experimental) 
2A. Bias:  neglect individual-level variables altogether 
2B. Bias: Xij effects are non-linear or non-additive 
2C. Bias: using aggregate version of cross-level interaction  
2D. Bias: magnified consequences of errors correlated with Xij (and, in turn Wi) 
2E. Bias: both Xij and X-bar affect Yij 
2F. Bias: Macro-level X is relational 
 
The advice:  
 
 Evaluate how macro-level Xs affect micro-level Ys even if you have no interest whatsoever in 
"political behavior." 
 Use logical induction to move from micro-level results to macro-level implications—the key move 
that must be made in order to test the original macro-level proposition. 
 Go well beyond the simple (and reductionist) set-up I have worked with here.  The ultimate goal is 
a more sophisticated and rich understanding of cross-level dynamics. 
II. Choosing Temporal Units of Analysis: The Issue of Granularity 
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
 FLOW STOCK
• Stocks: measured at points in time (e.g. stockpile of weapon, prices) 
• Flows: measured across periods of time (e.g. arms acquisition over a 
period, events—as discussed later) 
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
 FLOW STOCK
• Problem: Results are sensitive to choice of temporal units/intervals 
• Giant literature on this—in economics, especially.  Common advice found in my 
field is to evaluate sensitivity of results to the choice of temporal unit. 
• Question: Is there a “Natural unit” (stocks) or “natural interval” (flows)? 
 
• Natural unit (NTU) of a stock: “The shortest unit that satisfies the 
condition that all causally meaningful variation is between and not within 
units.”  
 
• Some Y’s do not vary freely (due to conventions, institutions)  
 
– Ex: President’s party; prime time news analysis 
– Measuring Y in nested (shorter) units adds no information  
– Measuring Y in longer units throws away information 
 
• Other Y’s can vary freely  
 
– Use theory and empirical tests to establish NTU 
• One possible test would compare a candidate unit (call this Ucand) to a 
shorter unit (call this Ushort).  One would hope to find no systematic 
variation in Ushort  across the Ucand units (i.e., the intraclass correlation, 
rho, would be 0).  If one had data on Xs gathered at the Ushort level as 
well as Ushort –level data on Y, one would also hope to find that none of 
the Xs can explain variation in Y once fixed effects for Ucand are 
specified. 
– Tradeoff sensitivity/reliability: select the shortest unit that satisfies 
the criterion above up to the point that doing so begins to entail 
reliability costs 
  
 
 
 
Number of temporal units in a year-long 
long research period:  
 
Months n=12 
Weeks n=52 
 Days  n=365
Hours n=8760 
Minutes n=525,600 
Seconds n=31,536,000 
1Shakes  n=3,153,599,999,996,478 
                                                 
1 A shake is 10 nanoseconds, roughly equivalent to the lifespan of a neutron.  Researchers have only recently developed the technology to 
measure atomic behaviour across such tiny temporal units.  See http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/smart-takes/ibm-claims-nanotech-
breakthrough-atoms-measured-in-nanoseconds/10905 (accessed 8/8/11). 
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• In Ys that vary freely, selection of a longer Y-unit than NTU will 
sometimes (often?) be necessary because of feasibility constraints 
 
• Example 1:  
 
– Y: Extent of President’s speech on terrorism 
– Xs: Terrorist incidents (daily); Lagged presidential approval 
(monthly); Party of President (quadriennially) 
 
NTU of Y: day—feasible 
 
• Example 2:  
 
– Y: Opinion on Social Security, varying across people and time 
– Hypothesis: Opinion shifts abruptly at age 65 
– Sample: Individuals aged 63-65 
– Research period: 1 year.  1/3 of individuals will remain <65, 1/3 
will turn 65 (on different days), 1/3 will be >65 to start.  
 
NTU of Y: day—infeasible (sample every Kth day) 
 
 
• “Natural interval” of a flow 
 
• Sometimes flows can be derived from stocks 
 
– T is stock-NTU; interval from T to T+1 is flow-unit 
 
• Not so in research on acts or events (e.g. riots, wars) 
 
– These are flows because they emerge between two time points 
 
– “+1” (“duration” of event) not obvious  
 
– NTU= unit of “minimum possible event duration?”  Often not a 
viable criterion (e.g. acts of protest), to put it mildly. Intervals 
too short. Impractical for data collection.  Many zeros (no 
events, no variation at all).  Nothing of theoretical interest to 
explain across such tiny intervals. (What explains variation in 
time of day in which protest occurs?  Do we care?) 
 
• Solutions:  
 
1. Move up to a longer and practicable interval if no signification information loss 
(most variation between and not within units) 
 
– Example: protest acts measured daily even if acts may last less 
• Very few cases of protest lasting more than a day 
• Variation in “time of the day” unlikely to be causally meaningful 
 
2. If data constraints, aggregate across a longer interval but  
 
– explain what the natural interval is and why it is not being used,  
– be more modest or cautious in the conclusions drawn 
 
3. Avoid temporal units altogether 
 
– When studying event characteristics (e.g., duration of or damage wrought 
by a riot), use events as units of analysis 
 
– Consider event sequence analysis, where actions or events sequenced in 
time (e.g., decision 1, decision 2, decision 3) serve as the units of analysis.  
III. Missed Opportunities for Temporal Disaggregation 
 
 
I. Longitudinal Variation in Cross-Sectional Surveys 
II. Temporal Disaggregation in Difference in Difference Analyses 
 
*** 
 
I. Longitudinal Variation in Cross-Sectional Surveys 
 
Long field periods and randomized release of sample 
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Temporal Disaggregation in Difference in Difference Analyses 
 
 
Low Birth Weight Infant Mortality Rates  
in Counties Upwind & Downwind of a Nuclear Reactor 
(hypothetical)
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Thank you! 
